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There seems to be a widespread belief among economists, policy-makers, and members of the media
that the "confidence'" of households and businesses is a critical component in the transmission of fiscal
policy shocks into economic activity.  We take this proposition to the data using standard structural
VARs with government spending and aggregate output augmented to include empirical measures of
consumer or business confidence.  We also estimate non-linear VAR specifications to allow for differential
impacts of government spending in "normal'' times versus recessions.  In normal times confidence
does not react significantly  to unexpected increases in government spending and spending multipliers
are in the neighborhood of one; during recessions confidence rises and spending multipliers are significantly
larger.  We then quantify the importance of the systematic response of confidence to spending shocks
for the spending multiplier and find that, in normal times, confidence is irrelevant for the transmission
of government spending shocks to output, but during periods of economic slack it is important.  We
argue and present evidence that it is not confidence per se – in the sense of pure sentiment – that matters
for the transmission of spending shocks during downturns, but rather that the composition of spending
during a downtown is different.  In particular, spending shocks during downturns predict future productivity
improvements through a persistent increase in government investment relative to consumption, which
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consumer con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\Condence matters independently of fundamentals!" { Roger Farmer, UCLA Today - Fac-
ulty and Sta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1 Introduction
A widespread belief among economists, policy-makers, and members of the news media is that
the \condence" of households and rms is a critical component in the transmission of policy
shocks into economic activity. A sampling of quotes from economists and policy-makers with
wide-ranging economic and political philosophies attests to this fact (see Appendix A.1).
We take this proposition to the data for the case of government spending shocks. A large
literature studies the eects of these shocks on the real economy, while another literature
examines the eects of condence on aggregate uctuations.1 To our knowledge no study
bridges these two literatures and explicitly examines the relationship between condence and
the transmission of policy shocks. Says John Cochrane (Cochrane, 2009): \Others say that
we should have a scal stimulus to `give people condence,' even if we have neither theory
nor evidence that it will work." This paper is a rst attempt at the latter.
Barsky and Sims (2011a) show that surprise changes in consumer condence are as-
sociated with long-lasting movements in macroeconomic aggregates. They argue that this
relationship between condence and the economy obtains because empirical measures of con-
dence are reective of changes in future economic fundamentals, in particular productivity.
In contrast, they argue that autonomous uctuations in condence unrelated to fundamen-
tals { i.e. what one might call \animal spirits" or \pure sentiment" { are unlikely to be
an important source of economic uctuations. Their analysis is, however, silent on whether
the systematic behavior of condence is important in the propagation of other shocks. We
address this question in this paper.
Given that there is no o-the-shelf workhorse model for condence or even a widely ac-
cepted channel by which condence might matter in the transmission of scal policy shocks,
1Examples for the rst group of papers are Shapiro and Ramey (1998), Mountford and Uhlig (2009),
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Rossi and Zubairy (2010), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011), Ramey
(2011), Feyrer and Sacerdote (2011), Nakamura and Steinsson (2011), and Shoag (2011). Examples for the
second group of papers are Carroll, Fuhrer, and Wilcox (1994), Matsusaka and Sbordone (1995), Barsky and
Sims (2011a), and Barsky and Sims (2011b).
1we use structural vector autoregressions (VAR), which need a minimum of theoretical restric-
tions, to identify government spending shocks and their eects on the macroeconomy. As
David Laibson and co-authors recently wrote, \If a sample of macroeconomists were forced
to write down a formal model of animal spirits, most wouldn't know where to start and the
rest would produce models that had little in common" (Fuster, Laibson, and Mendel, 2010).
We estimate VARs with a measure of government spending, an empirical measure of
either consumer or business condence, and aggregate output. The widely accepted identi-
fying restriction to isolate government spending shocks is that spending shocks impact the
economy immediately, whereas government spending only reacts to other shocks with a delay
(e.g. Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Ramey, 2011; Rossi and Zubairy, 2010). This amounts
to a recursive identication with government spending ordered rst. We implement this
assumption throughout the paper, allowing condence to directly and immediately respond
to surprise changes in government spending.
In such a VAR, the impulse response of output to a government spending shock is the
sum of two eects. First, there is a direct eect, because the government spending shock
is allowed to have a contemporaneous eect on output. This eect captures the standard
notion of a pure scal output multiplier. In addition, there is an indirect eect where scal
policy inuences condence which in turn inuences output. It is the hypothetical impulse
response which features only the direct eect that we isolate and compare to the actual
impulse response in order to answer the question of how important the systematic response
of condence to a spending shock is in the transmission of that spending shock into output.
We do this decomposition using the methodology proposed in Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson
(1998), Sims and Zha (2006), and Kilian and Lewis (2011). It amounts to constructing a
hypothetical sequence of some other shock in the system so as to leave the impulse response
of condence to a spending shock zero at all horizons. As a rst pass we use condence
innovations ordered second in a recursive identication for this purpose.
In conventional linear specications of the underlying VARs we nd little evidence to
support the notion that condence is an important part of the transmission of spending
shocks into economic activity. The estimated spending multipliers are generally just below
unity (see Hall, 2009, for an overview of the literature). Condence typically declines slightly
on impact in response to a spending shock and rises after a few quarters, though this response
is economically small and statistically insignicant. The hypothetical impulse responses
of macroeconomic aggregates in which we isolate the direct eect of government spending
on output without the systematic movement of condence are very similar to the actual
responses. These ndings are robust to a variety of dierent specications, including ones in
which we directly control for anticipated changes in government spending (Ramey, 2011). In
2short, condence does not appear to be a part of the transmission of government spending
shocks in normal times.
Recent theoretical (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2009; and Woodford, 2010) and
empirical (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2011; and Shoag, 2010) work has emerged arguing
that government spending multipliers might be large during periods of economic slack. To
capture the idea of government spending shocks having dierent eects during recessions, we
also estimate non-linear VAR specications. Following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011),
we allow the parameters of the VAR to dier during periods in which economic growth has
been weak for an extended period of time. Similar to them, we nd that spending multipliers
are signicantly larger during recessions than in normal times. In particular, our estimated
maximum spending multipliers range between 2 and 3 during recessions. Also, we nd that
condence signicantly rises on impact following a positive spending shock in a recession.2
These ndings suggest that condence may be an important part of the transmission
of spending shocks during periods of economic distress. Indeed, in the non-linear VAR
specications the hypothetical impulse response of output to a government spending shock
based only on the direct eect of government spending on output is much smaller than the
actual one. The estimated hypothetical spending multipliers are much closer to those from
the linear case, i.e. just below unity.
It is important to stress that the recessionary impulse responses of output to a spending
shock are small on impact, and are only large after a number of quarters. Indeed, the response
of output looks similar to the slowly-building response following a \news shock" about future
productivity (Beaudry and Portier, 2006; Barsky and Sims, 2011b). To investigate further,
we include in the VAR output per hour as a measure of labor productivity. We show that, in
a recession, a positive government spending shock is also associated with a slowly-building
and prolonged increase in productivity. Furthermore, when we isolate the direct eect of
the government spending shock, output and productivity react similarly to the linear case.
Given Barsky and Sims' (2011a) ndings about the relationship between condence and
future productivity, these results suggest that the condence innovations we identify may
be an amalgamation of \pure" condence innovations, by which we mean uctuations in
\sentiment" that are unrelated to fundamentals, and news about fundamentals.
We therefore modify the basic approach so as to isolate structural shocks in the system.
In particular, we identify what we call a \fundamentals" shock as a shock that explains
productivity in the long run and that is uncorrelated with the government spending shock.
We identify a \sentiment" shock as an innovation in condence orthogonalized with respect
2Mertens and Ravn (2010) provide a theoretical example where, in contrast, aggregate demand stimulation
decreases consumer condence.
3to both the government spending and \fundamentals" shocks. We then ask whether the large
indirect eect of government spending on output that operates through condence is mainly
due to the fundamental content or the sentiment content in measured condence. We thus
separately create hypothetical impulse response functions where we eliminate, respectively,
the indirect eect from future fundamentals and sentiment. Without the indirect sentiment
eect the output and productivity responses to a spending shock are nearly the same as in
the actual response. In contrast, without the indirect fundamental eect the output and
productivity responses to the spending shock are much smaller at all horizons. These results
suggest that it is not sentiment that is important in the transmission of government spending
shocks during times of economic slack, but rather a channel that works through productivity
at medium horizons.
This productivity channel is also consistent with our last nding: the composition of
government spending in response to identied spending shocks is very dierent in recessions
compared to normal times. In particular, we show that a spending shock in a recession
leads to a persistent increase in the amount of government investment relative to govern-
ment consumption; this is not the case in normal times. This relative increase in government
investment spending causes future productivity increases. The systematic response of con-
dence appears to largely reect this policy-induced change.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews mechanisms for
why condence might matter for the transmission of spending shocks. Section 3 describes
the data and our empirical strategy. Section 4 presents our main results. Section 5 discusses
why condence matters for the transmission of spending shocks during recessions. The nal
section concludes.
2 Why Might Condence Matter?
An old idea (Keynes, 1936) that has gained recent attention (Ackerlof and Shiller, 2008)
is that \animal spirits" in consumer and in particular business sentiment are central to
understanding economic uctuations. While intriguing, this idea lacks a widely accepted
theoretical structure, and has met with limited empirical success (see Barsky and Sims,
2011a, as well as Luzzetti and Ohanian, 2010). Loosely speaking, the idea is that aggregate
sentiment determines aggregate spending, which in turn determines aggregate output and
employment. Fiscal or monetary shocks from the government might signal a commitment
to aggregate stability, thereby raising sentiment, stimulating demand, and leading to an
economic expansion. This idea is related to the \sunspot" framework popularized by Farmer
(1998) and others, which holds that there are, at any time, multiple aggregate equilibria.
4Stimulating sentiment could cause the economy to jump from a \bad" equilibrium to a
\good" one.
Another related possibility includes a role for informational frictions and strategic comple-
mentarities in a world in which households fail to perfectly observe aggregate fundamentals
and use observed variables like aggregate output to form beliefs about the true fundamentals
(see Lorenzoni, 2009). Following a recession there might be induced sluggishness { the true
fundamentals might have improved but beliefs about the fundamentals are slow to catch
up, hence putting a brake on the recovery. By engaging in expansionary scal or monetary
policies, the government may be able to convince agents that fundamentals have improved,
thereby facilitating recovery.
Recently, Bai, Rios-Rull and Storesletten (2011) have advocated a model of consumer
search where the (variable) search eort of consumers is an input of the aggregate produc-
tion function. In such a context, one might interpret condence as search eort and thus
stimulative scal policy as having a positive impact on the willingness to search and shop.
Another possibility is that empirically measured condence is a measure of a time-varying
discount factor { periods of high condence are periods in which households discount the
future more, and thus are more willing to spend. If policies can lead to an increase in
condence, they might therefore stimulate demand over and above what would happen under
normal transmission channels.
And nally there is the view in Barsky and Sims (2011a) that autonomous innovations
to condence merely reect autonomous news about future fundamentals. This means that
scal policy, for example through investment in infrastructure, R & D and education, might
change agents' views about these future fundamentals and thus generate important system-
atic movements in condence. We provide evidence that is consistent with this view.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
Quarterly real GDP is taken from the BEA. We measure real government spending as the
sum of government consumption and gross investment. We divide both aggregate quantities
by the civilian non-institutionalized population aged 16 and over.
We draw on two data sources for subjective measures of condence { one for households
and one for businesses. The Michigan Survey of Consumers polls a nationally represen-
tative sample of households on a variety of questions concerning personal and aggregate
economic conditions. We focus on the Index of Consumer Expectations, which is an aver-
5age of the indices from three dierent forward-looking survey questions { one concerning
expectations about aggregate business conditions over the next year, another concerning
expectations about aggregate business conditions over the next ve years, and the third
concerning personal nancial conditions over the next year. These data are available at a
quarterly frequency beginning in the rst quarter of 1960.3
For business condence we use the Conference Board's CEO Condence Survey, which is
available at a quarterly frequency beginning in 1976. Figures 1 and 2 plot each condence
series over time. The shaded gray areas are recessions as dated by the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
3.2 Identifying Government Spending Shocks
Much of the empirical literature on the identication of government spending shocks is or can
be cast in a vector autoregression framework. Let gt be a time series measure of government
spending, and xt be a k  1 vector of other time series of interest observed at time t, (e.g.
output). Let Yt = [gt xt]
0 be (k + 1)  1. The structural VAR can be written (abstracting




AjYt j + "t (1)
p is the lag length and "t is a (k + 1)  1 vector of structural shocks, dened as being
uncorrelated with one another. A0 is the impact matrix. Restrictions must be imposed on A0
to uniquely recover the structural form. Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), most of the
literature imposes that in the rst row of A0 all elements but (1;1) be zero. Economically,
this assumption means that all the variables in xt react immediately to government spending
shocks, whereas government spending does not react on impact to other shocks in the system.
Given the delays inherent in the legislative system, this is a natural assumption. In an
econometric sense, the identifying assumption is equivalent to a Choleski factor with gt
ordered rst applied to the variance-covariance matrix of reduced-form innovations, 
u,
where ut = A
 1
0 "t, and where we interpret "1;t as the structural government spending shock.
3.3 Isolating the Role of Condence
So as to x ideas, let xt = [conft yt]
0, where conft is an empirical measure of condence and
yt is log real GDP. The identifying assumption on the timing eects of government spending
3In Appendix A.2 we replace consumer condence with a measure of consumer uncertainty (the cross-
sectional standard deviation of the answers to the \personal nance" question in the consumer survey).








































Let us rst look at how condence on impact inuences the transmission of spending
shocks into the other variables of interest. If condence reacts to government spending
immediately (a2;1 6= 0), and output reacts to condence immediately (a3;2 6= 0), then a2;1 
a3;2 measures the \condence" channel of government spending on impact. This is the
indirect impact eect. In contrast, a3;1 is the direct impact eect of spending on output.
In addition, condence can operate as a propagation mechanism of spending shocks,
whether it has an impact eect or not. For example, if condence reacts to spending shocks
at any horizon, and if the coecients on lagged condence are (economically) signicant in
the output equation, then the dynamic response of condence to a spending shock will have
an eect on the dynamic response of output to a spending shock.
Our objective is to statistically isolate the direct eect (in a dynamic sense) of spending
shocks on output from the indirect eect operating through condence, where this indirect
eect consists of both the indirect impact eect and the propagation mechanism discussed
above. In particular, we construct a hypothetical impulse response of output to a govern-
ment spending shock holding condence xed at all forecast horizons. A comparison of this
hypothetical response with the actual impulse response allows us to quantify how important
condence is as a transmission mechanism of government spending shocks.
In order to do so, we need to rst impose more structure on A0. While the timing as-
sumption that government spending does not react within period to condence or output is
sucient to identify a2;1 and a3;1, an additional restriction is required to identify a3;2 and
a2;3. We begin by imposing that a2;3 = 0, which amounts to identifying the system under a
Choleski decomposition with condence ordered second and output ordered third. We then
interpret "2;t as a condence shock and "3;t as a residual output shock. We use condence
shocks to \zero out" the condence response to a spending shock. Put dierently, we answer
the following question: while on average the output response to a government spending shock
is comprised of the direct eect and the indirect eect (through condence), and government
spending and condence shocks are uncorrelated - how would output have responded in a
hypothetical situation where condence shocks in the same structural economy completely
oset the eects of the government spending shock on condence? This eliminates the indi-
rect eect and isolates the direct eect of government spending on output. Notice that this
is a purely statistical decomposition of the actual average impulse response. We have simu-
7lated data from fully-specied DSGE models (both with and without an independent role for
condence) and conducted our decomposition on simulated data. The results are remarkably
good (and available upon request from the authors) and suggest that our empirical approach
does in fact do a good job of isolating the role of condence in the transmission of spending
shocks. Our approach is similar to the methodology used by, for example, Bernanke, Gertler,
and Watson (1998), Sims and Zha (2006), as well as Kilian and Lewis (2011).4
Once the restriction has been imposed on a2;3 and A0 has been recovered, the structural
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We can write this more compactly in companion matrix form as a VAR(1) by dening
Zt = [Yt Yt 1 :::Yt p 1]:
Zt = Zt 1 + A
 1
0 "t;  =
0
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Let ei be a selection row vector of dimension 1  3, with a one in the ith place and zeros
elsewhere. Let A
 1
0 (q) be the qth column of A
 1
0 . The impulse response of variable i to





The thought experiment of holding condence xed in response to a change in government
spending requires setting 2;1;h = 0 at each forecast horizon, where 2 is the position indicator
for condence and 1 is the index of the spending shock. We accomplish this by creating a
4There is an alternative interpretation of our research question whether condence matters in the trans-
mission of government spending shocks. While in the baseline approach we x the underlying economic
environment and study particular statistical shock combinations that hit this economy, one could also study
the output response to a government spending shock in a dierent and restricted economy, where we restrict
government spending not to move condence at any horizon. In practice, this amounts to a restricted VAR
estimation, setting a2;1 = 0 (which would impose that condence not react to spending on impact), and then
to restrict the AR coecients of the system in such a way that condence does not react to spending shocks
at subsequent horizons either. In Appendix A.4 we show that this approach yields very similar results,
compared to the baseline methodology. This gives us additional condence in our ndings.
5This calculation requires augmenting both A
 1
0 (q) and ei with 3  p rows or columns of zeros for the
matrix multiplication to work, given the dimension of Zt, which is (p + 1)  3.
8hypothetical sequence of condence innovations, "2;h, so as to force this to hold at each
relevant horizon. On impact this evidently requires:
A
 1
0 (2;1) + A
 1


















h = 2;:::;H (7)
Given this sequence, we can compute the modied impulse responses of the variables in
the system to the spending shock as:






0 (2)"2;j i = 1;:::;3 (8)
We will refer to the modied impulse responses, e i;1;h, as the responses to a spending
shock \without condence" or as the \direct eect". That is, these are the impulse responses
to a spending shock when the response of condence is held xed at zero for all horizons.
Comparing these hypothetical responses with the actual average responses, i;1;h, provides
a statistical measure of how important the response of condence is in the transmission of
the spending shock.
3.4 Non-Linear Specication
Traditional Keynesian thinking and some recent theoretical work (Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo, 2009, and Woodford, 2010) both suggest that scal policy may be more potent
when the economy is experiencing signicant slack. So as to allow for this possibility, we
also consider a non-linear VAR specication similar to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011).
Following them, let zt be a backward-looking seven quarter moving average of real GDP




;  > 0: (9)
f(zt) is thus bound between 0 and 1, and can be interpreted as the probability of being in a
recession given observations on zt. f(zt)  1 means that zt is very negative, while f(zt)  0
means that zt is very positive. We calibrate  = 1:5 to match the frequency of post-War US
recessions and dene a \recession" as a period in which f(zt) was greater than 0.8 any time
in the previous year. This lines up well with NBER-dened recessions, as shown in Figure
3, which plots f(zt) against time, with the shaded gray regions denoting NBER dened
9recessions.














t j + "t (10)
r = 1 if maxff(zt 4) : f(zt)g  0:8
r = 0 if maxff(zt 4) : f(zt)g < 0:8
In words, Yt follows an autoregressive process depending on its own lags, its own lags inter-
acted with zt, and its own lags interacted with z2
t. These interaction terms allow the AR
coecients to vary with the state of the economy. We assume that the impact matrix, A0,
takes on two values { one in \normal" times (A0
0) and one in \recessions" (A1
0). This amounts
to allowing for a conditionally heteroskedastic variance-covariance matrix of reduced form
innovations and the impact eects of shocks to be dierent across the two regimes.
This specication nests the linear case when A2;j = A3;j = 0 8j and when A0
0 = A1
0. The
identifying assumptions on A0 are identical to the linear specication, and the procedure
for isolating the role of condence is (conceptually) the same as well. To compute impulse
responses for a recession we x zt initially at its sample average conditional on r = 1, and
then compute the subsequent zt consistently with the estimated impulse response of output.
4 Results
4.1 Linear VARs
As a benchmark, we estimate a system with log real government spending, a measure of
condence, and log real GDP. We estimate the system in levels with four lags. Inference is
conducted via Kilian's (1998) bias-corrected bootstrap after bootstrap.
Figure 4 shows impulse responses using consumer condence data. The solid lines are the
estimated responses to a one standard deviation government spending shock. The shaded
gray regions are 90 percent condence bands. Government spending follows a hump-shaped
response but is nevertheless fairly persistent. Output rises by about 0.2 percent on impact
before reverting back to its pre-shock value. Condence actually falls on impact before rising
slightly a few quarters later. This response, however, is never signicantly (in the statistical
sense) dierent from zero.
The dashed lines in Figure 4 show the hypothetical impulse responses holding the response
10of condence xed at zero. The direct response of output without the endogenous response
of condence is indeed lower, suggesting a positive role of condence in the transmission of
scal policy. However, the dierences in the impulse responses are economically small and
statistically insignicant.
Keynes, for example, saw the role of animal spirits particularly with entrepreneurs and
their business investment decisions. That is why in Figure 5 we use the business condence
index in lieu of the consumer condence series. The responses are very similar. Government
spending follows a hump-shaped response to a spending shock, condence initially falls and
then rises, and the initial impact on output is an increase of about 0.2 percent. As in the
case with consumer condence, the impulse responses to the spending shock when condence
is held xed are very similar to the actual responses, although again the point estimate for
the output response does suggest a small stimulating role for condence.
Next, we present the corresponding spending multipliers in two dierent versions: the
\impact" multiplier and the \max" multiplier. The impact multiplier is essentially the
impact response of output divided by the impact response of government spending to a
spending shock. The max multiplier is the maximum response of output taken over the
rst sixteen quarters divided by the impact response of government spending. As both
government spending and output enter the estimated VARs in logs, these multipliers would
be elasticities. To put the multipliers in dollar terms, we multiply them by the sample
average ratio of output to spending.
Table 1 shows the estimated multipliers. The rst column, labeled \Actual", gives the
estimated spending multipliers in both the system estimated with consumer condence and
the system estimated with CEO condence. The numbers in brackets are the 90 percent
bootstrap condence bands. The estimated multipliers are all in the neighborhood of one,
which is in line with most previous estimates (e.g. Ramey, 2011). The impact and max
multipliers are both about 0.7 for the system with consumer condence, suggesting that a
one dollar increase in spending generates about 70 cents in extra output. In the system
with CEO condence, the impact multiplier is close to 1 and the max multiplier is 1.2; the
dierence in multipliers between the two systems results primarily from the dierent sample
horizons used (from 1960 on for consumer condence and from 1976 on for CEO condence,
due to data availability). The second column, labeled \Without Condence", gives the
estimated hypothetical multipliers when condence is held xed following a government
spending shock. These are very similar to the actual ones.
We conduct a number of additional robustness checks on our basic result. The most
important one concerns anticipation eects with respect to government spending shocks.
Ramey (2011) emphasizes that VAR shocks to government spending are actually predictable,
11Table 1: Government Spending Multipliers in Normal Times
Actual Without Condence
Consumer Condence
Impact Multiplier 0.684 0.765
[0.29, 1.10] [0.39, 1.17]
Max Multiplier 0.759 0.770
[0.43, 2.33] [0.43, 1.20]
CEO Condence
Impact Multiplier 0.967 0.990
[0.47, 1.56] [0.52, 1.53]
Max Multiplier 1.223 0.991
[0.65, 3.64] [0.52, 1.72]
This table shows spending multipliers from the benchmark three variable systems described in Section 3. The
\Actual" column corresponds to the standard VAR specication, and the following \Without Condence"
column is the multiplier when the response of condence is held xed. The numbers have the interpretation
as the dollar impact on output (either on impact { `Impact Multiplier' { or the maximum eect { `Max
Multiplier' { over 16 quarters) for a one dollar increase in spending. The numbers in brackets are 90 percent
bootstrap condence intervals.
which can render impulse response functions biased. She proposes a measure of anticipated
government spending, ga
t, that is equal to the present discounted value of future spending,
based on the reading of news reported in Business Week and other newspaper sources. In
order to accommodate these anticipation eects, the VAR system to be estimated has to
be modied to Yt = [ga
t gt xt]
0. The unanticipated government spending shock is then
identied as the innovation in gt ordered second (i.e. after ga
t). We show in Appendix A.3
that our results are robust to directly accounting for spending news a la Ramey (2011).
The inclusion of additional variables other than output, such as aggregate consumption,
in the block of variables xt also does not substantively aect our conclusions or our estimates
of spending multipliers. We prefer to keep xt small because our non-linear specications place
large burdens on the data.6 Our results are also largely unaected by dierent lag lengths
or dierent assumptions concerning common trends (e.g. estimating a VECM instead of a
VAR in levels or including a deterministic time trend).
In summary, the evidence from the linear VAR specications suggests that, on average,
condence is not an important part of the transmission of government spending shocks into
output. The actual impulse response of output to a government spending shock is very
6In the benchmark system there are pq autoregressive parameters to estimate, where p is the lag length
and q is the number of variables. In the non-linear estimation there are 3  p  q parameters to estimate,
which grows quickly with q.
12similar to the one that features only the direct eect of spending on output. The spending
multipliers are always estimated to be in the neighborhood of one, regardless of whether
condence is allowed to react to the spending shock or not.
4.2 Non-Linear VARs
Next we examine results from the non-linear specication detailed in Section 3.4. As in
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011), we nd that the output eects of government spending
are much larger in recessions than in normal times. Figure 6 shows impulse responses to a
spending shock in a recession, with the size of the shock normalized to be the same as in
the linear system. The dashed lines are the impulse responses in a recession, the solid lines
are the responses estimated from the linear system, and the shaded gray areas are the 90
percent condence bands from the linear estimation. Two main features stand out. First,
the output response to a spending shock is very dierent in a recession compared to normal
times. Importantly, most of the dierence is at longer horizons rather than shortly after the
spending shock. Secondly, consumer condence increases on impact and is persistently high
following a spending shock. This impulse response is statistically dierent from the linear
case. Figure 7 gives the same picture using CEO condence: condence rises in response to
a spending shock and the output response is much larger than in the linear case, particularly
at longer horizons.7
Having established that output and condence respond quite dierently to government
spending shocks in recessions relative to normal times, we next investigate how important the
condence response is for the output response in recessions. Figures 8 and 9 show actual and
hypothetical (holding condence xed) impulse responses in recessions, for systems estimated
with consumer and CEO condence, respectively. The shaded gray regions are the condence
bands for the impulse responses to a spending shock in recessions.8 Given that we eectively
have few observations for recessions, these bands are signicantly wider than in the linear
case. For both cases we see that shutting down the response of condence to a spending
shock renders the output response signicantly smaller and more similar to what obtains
in the linear specication. Put dierently, it appears as though the systematic response of
empirical condence measures is critical to the transmission of the spending shock to output
7As an additional numerical test of the non-linear specication we started the impulse response also at
zt = 0, i.e. f(zt) = 0:5, and recuperated essentially the linear response.
8These condence bands are constructed dierently from the condence bands in the linear case so as to
preserve the heteroskedasticity of the innovations. In particular, instead of a parametric bootstrap where we
re-sample the innovations, here we do a non-parametric block bootstrap where we resample the growth rates
of the underlying series in the VAR. Then we estimate VARs on the resampled series to construct condence
regions.
13in recessions.9
Table 2 quanties this nding. Although the impact multipliers in recessions are about
the same as their linear counterparts, the max multipliers for government spending range
between 2 and 3, about two to three times as large as in the linear case. The multipliers
holding condence xed, in contrast, are signicantly smaller and close to one. While the
condence bands are indeed wide, the evidence suggests that spending multipliers are much
larger in recessions than in normal times and that conventional condence measures are
related to it.
Table 2: Government Spending Multipliers in Recessions
Recession Without Condence
Consumer Condence
Impact Multiplier 0.388 0.260
[0.12, 1.91] [-0.22, 1.97]
Max Multiplier 3.08 0.260
[0.42, 3.21] [0.14, 2.60]
CEO Condence
Impact Multiplier 1.019 0.835
[0.15,1.53] [0.29, 1.72]
Max Multiplier 2.498 0.835
[0.92,5.57] [0.61, 3.88]
See notes to Table 1. The \Recession" column corresponds to the recession estimates from the non-linear
specication, and the following column presents multipliers in the case where the response of condence is
held xed. The numbers have the interpretation as the dollar impact on output (either on impact { `Impact
Multiplier' { or the maximum eect { `Max Multiplier' { over 16 quarters) for a one dollar increase in
spending. The numbers in brackets are 90 percent bootstrap condence intervals.
9In Appendix A.2 we show that consumer uncertainty has similar eects in the transmission of government
spending shocks. It appears that government spending shocks not only help to restore condence, but also
decrease uncertainty about the future.
Also, see Appendix A.5 for a discussion of how robust this result is to an alternative specication based on
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). One might be concerned that the dierence we nd in the hypothetical
output responses between normal times and recessions is due to government spending being less persistent,
when condence is shut down in recessions (see Figures 10 and 11). This could render the output response
to a spending shock smaller. To test whether this drives our results, we run a SUR specication, where the
systematic response of government spending does not depend directly on condence, but only on output and
its own lags. Our conclusions remain the same.
145 Why and How Does Condence Matter?
The evidence from the previous section suggests that measured condence of households and
rms may play an important role in the transmission of government spending shocks into
output during times of economic slack. Prime facie, this nding might be viewed as evidence
for \animal spirits" type explanations or as evidence for many of the quotations listed in the
Introduction and in Appendix A.1. However, a closer inspection of Figures 8 and 9 reveals
that condence reacts strongest on impact after a government spending shock in a recession,
whereas the output response is slowly-building. In a world with \animal spirits" we would
likely see a similarly strong impact response of output.
Barsky and Sims (2011a) show that unexpected autonomous increases in measured con-
sumer condence are associated with slowly-building and persistent increases in output,
consumption, and productivity. They argue that condence innovations reect news about
future economic fundamentals. Nevertheless, they do show a large fraction of empirical
condence uctuations is not explained by news shocks, leaving room for a potentially im-
portant pure sentiment channel. We next investigate whether it is again news about future
fundamentals or pure sentiment that makes the systematic response of condence important
in the scal policy transmission to economic activity.
We start, in the spirit of their analysis, by including an empirical measure of productivity
into the set of variables xt in our estimated VAR. We use the BLS measure of output per
hour in the non-farm business sector. Formally, the VAR to be estimated includes govern-
ment spending, condence, output, and productivity. To have a longer sample size, we focus
on the results using consumer condence. Figure 10 shows responses to the spending shock
from this four variable system, both for the linear case (solid line) and in a recession from
the non-linear estimation (dashed lines). As in the smaller system, condence increases on
impact in a recession and the output response is much larger, particularly at long horizons.
The productivity response to a spending shock is much the same as the output response {
essentially zero on impact followed by a large and protracted increase. Put dierently, a
government spending shock in a recession apparently leads to a very persistent and econom-
ically large increase in productivity. In contrast, the response of productivity to a spending
shock in the linear specication is essentially zero at all horizons.
Figure 11 shows the estimated impulse responses to a spending shock in a recession as
well as the responses when condence is held xed. We again use condence innovations
ordered second in a Choleski decomposition in order to construct these hypothetical re-
sponses. As in Figures 9 and 10, eliminating the endogenous condence response renders
the hypothetical output response to a spending shock signicantly smaller. Also, the pro-
ductivity response to a spending shock is close to zero at all horizons in this case. That
15the productivity response is so dierent (particularly at longer horizons) indicates that the
large role we attribute to condence in the transmission mechanism may indeed be due to
a \fundamentals" rather than a pure \sentiment" channel. In particular, it is possible that
government spending shocks during recessions work to stimulate productivity, which in turn
raises measured condence.
To determine whether measured condence matters for the transmission of spending
shocks through a \sentiment" or a \fundamentals" channel, we identify four structural shocks
from the four variable system with productivity. The rst shock is the government spending
shock, identied using the maintained recursive restriction that spending not react within
period to any of the three other shocks. The second shock is what we call a \fundamen-
tals" shock. It is identied as having the maximum eect on the forecast error variance of
productivity at a horizon of twenty quarters.10 This can be thought of as an approximation
to a long run restriction; it is proposed in Francis, Owyang, Roush, and DiCecio (2010),
who show that it has superior nite sample properties over conventional long run restric-
tions. The third shock is what we call a \sentiment" shock. The sentiment shock is the
condence innovation orthogonalized with respect to the government spending and \funda-
mentals" shocks. The idea is that it reects pure sentiment, i.e. movements in condence
unrelated to movements in productivity several years out into the future. The nal shock is
identied as contemporaneously aecting output but not productivity on impact; it has no
direct structural interpretation.
We consider two separate cases. In the rst case we create a hypothetical sequence of
\sentiment" shocks to hold condence xed and to identify the indirect eect in response
to an increase in government spending. The procedure is conceptually identical to the one
laid out in Section 3.3 under the assumption that government spending inuences measured
condence only through \sentiment". In the second case we create a hypothetical sequence
of \fundamentals" shocks to hold condence xed. This identies the indirect eect if
government spending inuences measured condence only through \fundamentals". Figure
12 shows the responses during a recession estimated from the non-linear specication. The
solid lines are the actual responses to a spending shock, the dashed lines are the responses
without condence where condence is held xed with \sentiment" shocks, and the dotted
lines are the responses without condence where condence is held xed with \fundamentals"
shocks. We see that the dotted line responses with hypothetical \fundamentals" shocks show
output and productivity essentially not reacting at any horizon; these responses are very
similar to the responses without condence shown in Figure 11. In contrast, the dashed lines
with hypothetical \sentiment" shocks are fairly similar to the actual responses. Eliminating
10We have experimented with other horizons, like 30 quarters, without much eect on our results.
16the condence eect with \sentiment" innovations does relatively little to the responses of
output and productivity to a spending shock { these are still slowly-building and large,
particularly at longer horizons.
These ndings suggest that pure \sentiment" is a relatively unimportant component of
the transmission of spending shocks into real output in a period of economic slack. Rather
than through stimulating sentiment, government spending shocks appear to have dierential
eects on economic activity during recessions via a channel that manifests itself through
labor productivity, particularly several quarters after the shock.
It is not dicult to imagine theoretical economies in which increases in public expenditure
stimulate private sector productivity. For example, spending on infrastructure and education
may lead to complementarities which encourage private sector capital accumulation, thereby
stimulating private sector labor productivity.11 We investigate this possibility by decom-
posing total government spending into its two main constituent components { consumption
and investment. Government consumption \consists of the goods and services that are pro-
duced by the general government, less sales to other sectors" while government investment
\consists of purchases of new structures and of equipment and software both by the general
government and government enterprises."12 We estimate a four variable system featuring
the following variables: total government spending, consumer condence, real output, and
the log ratio of government investment to consumption expenditure. We are interested in
whether overall spending shocks dierentially aect the mix of expenditures in recessions as
opposed to normal times.
Figure 13 compares the impulse responses to a spending shock from the linear system
(solid line) with the recession responses from the same system, estimated in the non-linear
specication (dashed line). We see that in the linear case the ratio of investment to con-
sumption expenditure rises on impact following a spending shock, but thereafter quickly
reverts back to its pre-shock level. In contrast, the response of the government invest-
ment/consumption ratio in a downturn is quite dierent. Rather than reverting back to its
pre-shock value, the investment/consumption ratio remains permanently higher following a
spending shock during a recession. This suggests that there is an important dierence in the
longer term consequences for the composition of government spending following a spending
shock in a recession { during recessions government spending shocks are more persistently
geared towards investment rather than consumption. This dierential mix could explain the
much larger output response during a downturn. The large output multiplier estimated here
is consistent with the results in Feyre and Sacerdote (2011), who emphasize the dierent
11See Aschauer's (1989) seminal contribution.
12See A Guide to the NIPAs at http://www.bea.gov/national/pdf/nipaguid.pdf.
17multipliers for dierent kinds of government spending. In particular, they report multipliers
associated with infrastructure spending in the neighborhood of 2.
Figure 14 shows the hypothetical impulse responses in a recession. As in Figure 12, we
consider two separate cases { one without \sentiment" and one without \fundamentals".
These shocks are identied as described above, though the \fundamentals" shock is iden-
tied o of the medium run behavior of output, since productivity is not in the estimated
VAR.13 The impulse responses without sentiment are very similar to the actual response in a
recession; in contrast, the responses where condence is shut down with the \fundamentals"
innovation are much closer to the baseline linear estimates. This suggests that the key chan-
nel through which government spending shocks have a dierential eect on output during
recessions is that spending shocks in a recession are geared more towards investment, which
in turn stimulates private sector productivity, output, and condence.14 Pure sentiment
appears to play at best a minor role.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we tackle the following question: Does the transmission of scal spending
shocks depend on systematic movements in consumer and business condence? In doing so,
we shed some new light on how expansionary scal policy stimulates the economy, and, to the
best of our knowledge, study for the rst time the role of systematic movements in consumer
and business condence for aggregate economic uctuations. We nd that the endogenous
response of conventional measures of condence explains almost all of the output stimulus in
recessions, whereas its role in normal times is minor. Importantly, the positive response of
output and productivity to a scal stimulus during times of slack is mild on impact, gradual
and prolonged. This suggests that scal stimulus in recessions is really dierent from scal
stimulus in normal times in that it boosts long-term productivity. Indeed, we nd that scal
expansions in recessions are more persistently geared towards government investment. It is
this long-term productivity boost that is reected in the important role of the systematic
response of conventional condence measures for recessionary scal transmission, not pure
sentiment.
13If we replace output with productivity we get nearly identical results.
14This also means that Robert Russell got it wrong (see his quote in Appendix A.1): the government
building bridges and new roads per se will restore condence inasmuch this increases future productivity.
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This gure plots the Index of Consumer Expectations from the Michigan Survey of Consumers. Shaded gray
areas are recessions as dened by the NBER.
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This gure plots the composite CEO condence index from the Conference Board. Shaded gray areas are
recessions as dened by the NBER.
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This gure plots f(zt) =
exp( zt)
1+exp( zt); = 1:5, where zt is dened as the seven quarter moving average of
real GDP growth. Shaded gray areas are recessions as dened by the NBER. The dashed black line is our
cuto for calling a period a \recession": f(zt) = 0:8.
23Figure 4: Government Spending and Consumer Condence
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Linear IRF w/o Confidnece
This gure shows impulse responses to a government spending shock from the benchmark system with gov-
ernment spending, consumer condence, and real GDP. The solid lines are the estimated impulse responses.
The shaded gray areas are 90 percent condence bands, using the bias-corrected Bootstrap of Kilian (1998).
The dashed lines are the impulse responses when condence is held xed.
24Figure 5: Government Spending and CEO Condence
Gov. Spending to Gov. Spending
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Linear IRF w/o Confidnece
This gure shows impulse responses to a government spending shock from the benchmark system with
government spending, business condence, and real GDP. The solid lines are the estimated impulse responses.
The shaded gray areas are 90 percent condence bands. The dashed lines are the impulse responses when
condence is held xed.
25Figure 6: Government Spending and Consumer Condence: Recessions
Gov. Spending to Gov. Spending
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The dashed lines in this gure are impulse responses to a government spending shock in a recession estimated
from a non-linear system with government spending, consumer condence, and real GDP. The solid lines
are the estimated impulse responses from the linear system, and the shaded gray areas are the 90 percent
condence bands from the linear system. The size of the shock in the non-linear system has been normalized
to be the same as in the linear system.
26Figure 7: Government Spending and CEO Condence: Recessions
Gov. Spending to Gov. Spending
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The dashed lines in this gure are impulse responses to a government spending shock in a recession estimated
from a non-linear system with government spending, CEO condence, and real GDP. The solid lines are the
estimated impulse responses from the linear system, and the shaded gray areas are the 90 percent condence
bands from the linear system. The size of the shock in the non-linear system has been normalized to be the
same as in the linear system.
27Figure 8: Government Spending and Consumer Condence: Recessions with and without
Condence
Gov. Spending to Gov. Spending
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Recession IRF w/o Confidence
The solid lines in this gure are estimated impulse responses to a government spending shock in a recession
estimated from the non-linear specication. The shaded gray regions are 90 percent condence bands.
The dashed lines are the impulse responses when condence is held xed. The underlying system features
consumer condence. The size of the shock has been normalized to be the same as in the linear system.
28Figure 9: Government Spending and CEO Condence: Recessions and with and without
Condence
Gov. Spending to Gov. Spending
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Recession IRF w/o Confidence
The solid lines in this gure are estimated impulse responses to a government spending shock in a recession
estimated from the non-linear specication. The shaded gray regions are 90 percent condence bands. The
dashed lines are the impulse responses when condence is held xed. The underlying system features CEO
condence. The size of the shock has been normalized to be the same as in the linear system.
29Figure 10: Government Spending, Condence, and Productivity
Gov. Spending to Gov. Spending
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This gure shows impulse responses from a VAR featuring government spending, consumer condence, real
output, and labor productivity. The solid black lines are the impulse responses to a spending shock from
the linear system; the shaded gray regions are the associated 90 percent condence bands. The dashed lines
are the impulse responses to a spending shock in a recession. The size of the shock in the non-linear system
has been normalized to be the same as in the linear system.
30Figure 11: Government Spending, Condence, and Productivity: with and without
Condence
Gov. Spending to Gov. Spending
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Recession IRF w/o Confidence
This gure shows impulse responses from a VAR featuring government spending, consumer condence, real
output, and labor productivity. The solid black lines are the estimated impulse responses in a recession and
the shaded gray areas are the 90 percent condence bands. The dashed lines are the impulse responses when
condence is held xed. The size of the shock has been normalized to be the same as in the linear system.
31Figure 12: Government Spending, Condence, and Productivity: Alternative
Decomposition
Gov. Spending to Gov. Spending
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Recession IRF w/o Sentiment
Recession w/o Fundamental
This gure shows impulse responses from a VAR featuring government spending, consumer condence, real
output, and labor productivity. The solid black lines are the estimated impulse responses in a recession and
the shaded gray areas are the 90 percent condence bands. The dashed lines are the estimated responses
when condence is held xed using a hypothetical sequence of \sentiment" shocks. The dotted lines are the
responses when condence is held xed using a hypothetical sequence of \fundamentals" shocks. The size of
the shock has been normalized to be the same as in the linear system.
32Figure 13: Government Spending, Condence, and Spending Components: Recessions
Gov. Spending to Gov. Spending
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This gure shows impulse responses from a VAR featuring government spending, consumer condence, real
output, and the log-ratio of government investment to consumption expenditure. The solid black lines are
the estimated impulse responses in the linear system and the shaded gray areas are the 90 percent condence
bands. The dashed lines are the estimated responses in a recession from our non-linear specication. The
size of the shock in the non-linear system has been normalized to be the same as in the linear system.
33Figure 14: Government Spending, Condence, and Spending Components: with and
without Condence
Gov. Spending to Gov. Spending
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Recession IRF w/o Fundamental
This gure shows impulse responses from a VAR featuring government spending, consumer condence, real
output, and the log-ratio of government investment to consumption expenditure. The solid black lines are
the estimated impulse responses in a recession and the shaded gray areas are the 90 percent condence bands.
The dashed lines are the estimated responses when condence is held xed using a hypothetical sequence of
\sentiment" shocks. The dotted lines are the responses when condence is held xed using a hypothetical




\We must be certain that programs to solve the current nancial and economic crisis are
large enough, and targeted broadly enough, to impact public condence." { Robert Shiller,
Wall Street Journal, January 27, 2009
\Yale's Bob Shiller argues that condence is the key to getting the economy back on track.
I think a lot of economists would agree with that. [...]. The sad truth is that we economists
don't know very much about what drives the animal spirits of economic participants. Until
we gure it out, it is best to be suspicious of any policy whose benets are supposed to work
through the amorphous channel of 'condence.'" { N. Gregory Mankiw, Blog, January 27,
2009
\Enacting such a conditional stimulus would have two desirable eects. First, it would im-
mediately boost the condence of households and businesses since they would know that a
signicant slowdown would be met immediately by a substantial scal stimulus." { Mar-
tin Feldstein, Testimony to the Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives,
December 5, 2007
\But the economy is not stagnant because of a lack of spending. The economy is stagnant
because of a lack of condence in the future. Government spending on bridges, roads and
new schools will stimulate the construction industry. But without condence, the benets will
not spread to the rest of the economy." { Russell Roberts, Forbes.com, January 23, 2009
\The stimulus was too small, and it will fade out next year, while high unemployment is
undermining both consumer and business condence." { Paul Krugman, New York Times,
November 23, 2009
\Economic activity in the United States turned up in the second half of 2009, supported by
an improvement in nancial conditions, stimulus from monetary and scal policies, and a
recovery in foreign economies. These factors, along with increased business and household
condence, appear likely to boost spending and sustain the economic expansion." { Ben
Bernanke, Monetary Policy Report to the Congress, February 24, 2010
\Condence today will be enhanced if we put measures in place that assure that the coming
expansion will be more sustainable and fair in the distribution of benets than its predeces-
sor." { Larry Summers, Responding to an Historic Economic Crisis: The Obama Program
Brookings Institution, March 13, 2009
35\President Obama's top priority has been to stop the vicious cycle of economic and nancial
collapse, stem the historic rate of job loss, restore condence and put the economy on a path
to recover." { Larry Summers, memo to Members of Congress Re: Status Report on Rescuing
and Rebuilding the American Economy, August 4, 2009
\The subsequent global sell-o in equity markets suggested that governments would need to
take action with more immediate impact to restore condence in the markets." { James
Bullard, The U.S. Economy and Financial Market Turmoil, October 14, 2008
A.2 Government Spending and Consumer Uncertainty
In the benchmark approach we investigate the role of consumer condence in the transmission
of government spending shocks. Consumer condence is essentially a cross-sectional average
of the qualitative survey responses to questions like \Now looking ahead - do you think that
a year from now you (and your family living there) will be better o nancially, or worse o,
or just about the same as now?". The answers are quantied as +1 if the answer is \better
o", as  1 if \worse o" and as 0 otherwise.15
Researchers have used the cross-sectional standard deviation of these qualitative survey
responses to measure consumer uncertainty or the dispersion of beliefs in the population (see
Bachmann, Elstner and Sims, 2010, as an example). In this Appendix we test whether the
transmission of government spending shocks into aggregate economic activity might work
through an impact on consumer uncertainty (as measured through the dispersion of the
\personal nance" question above), rather than consumer condence.16
Figures A-1 to A-3 repeat the same three steps as with condence: the linear actual
and hypothetical impulse responses (see Figure 4), the linear and recession actual impulse
responses (see Figure 6) and the recession actual and hypothetical impulse responses (see Fig-
ure 8). Three ndings are noteworthy: 1) a surprise increase in government spending leads to
a decrease in consumer uncertainty, and when the indirect eect through uncertainty is taken
out the output stimulus is weaker, albeit only slightly so; 2) the uncertainty-decreasing eect
of government spending is (if not stronger on impact) much more prolonged in a recession
compared to normal times; 3) taking out the indirect eect of government spending through
uncertainty renders the positive output response weaker, more so than in normal times, but
not signicantly so. We conclude that scal stimulus has a similar eect through a reduction
in consumer uncertainty as it has through a boost in measured consumer condence.
15The Michigan Index of Consumer Expectations that we are using is an average of these cross-sectional
averages across several forward-looking questions, such as the \personal nance" question above.
16We experimented with the one-year-ahead and ve-year-ahead business expectation questions, which
make up the other two questions from the Index of Consumer Expectations with similar results.
36Figure A-1: Government Spending and Consumer Uncertainty
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Linear IRF w/o Dispersion
Figure A-1 shows impulse responses to a government spending shock from the benchmark system with
government spending, consumer uncertainty, and real GDP. The solid lines are the estimated actual impulse
responses. The shaded gray areas are 90 percent condence bands. The dashed lines are the hypothetical
impulse responses when uncertainty is held xed.
Figure A-2: Government Spending and Consumer Uncertainty: Recessions
Gov. Spending to Gov. Spending
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The dashed lines in Figure A-2 are impulse responses to a government spending shock in a recession estimated
from a non-linear system with government spending, consumer uncertainty, and real GDP. The solid lines
are the estimated impulse responses from the linear system, and the shaded gray areas are the 90 percent
condence bands from the linear system. The size of the shock in the non-linear system has been normalized
to be the same as in the linear system.
37Figure A-3: Government Spending and Consumer Uncertainty: Recessions with and without
Uncertainty
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Recession IRF w/o Dispersion
The solid lines in Figure A-3 are estimated impulse responses to a government spending shock in a recession
estimated from the non-linear specication. The shaded gray regions are 90 percent condence bands. The
dashed lines are the hypothetical impulse responses when uncertainty is held xed. The size of the shock
has been normalized to be the same as in the linear system.
A.3 Accounting for Fiscal News
Ramey (2011) stresses that conventional VAR-identied government spending shocks are
often predictable. As a remedy, she produces a time series of \news" about the present dis-
counted value of expected changes in future defense spending, based on a narrative reading
of the historical record (readings of Business Week and other periodicals). This can be incor-
porated into the VAR, with the system of variables to be estimated Yt = [ga
t gt conft xt],
where ga
t is the defense news variable. We can then identify impulse responses to two dier-
ent spending shocks: defense news (the innovation in the defense news series ordered rst),
and the conventional unanticipated government spending shock (the innovation in actual
government spending ordered after the news variable). We can construct the hypothetical
impulse responses in which the response of condence is held xed just as in the usual case.
Figure A-4 shows the actual and hypothetical responses of actual spending, condence, and
real GDP to the defense news shock. Figure A-5 does the same for a surprise spending shock.
38Figure A-4: Impulse Responses to Defense News
Gov. Spending to Gov. News








−3 Confidence to Gov. News









Output to Gov. News
 
 











Linear IRF w/o Confidence
Figure A-5: Impulse Responses to Unanticipated Spending
Gov. Spending to Gov. Spending
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Figure A-4 shows the impulse responses to a defense news shock as dened in Ramey (2011). Figure A-
5 shows impulse responses to an unanticipated government spending shock. The system features defense
news, total government spending, consumer condence, and real GDP. The solid lines are the estimated
impulse responses. The shaded gray areas are 90 percent condence bands. The dashed lines are the impulse
responses when condence is held xed.
Eliminating the indirect eect of condence leaves the output response to the defense
news shock smaller than in the actual impulse response, as we might expect, though the
dierence is statistically insignicant. Comparison of Figure A-5 with the corresponding
gure in the case where we do not include the defense news variable (Figure 4) reveals
that the responses to a surprise spending shock are very similar. Figure A-6 below shows
the recession and linear impulse responses to an unanticipated government spending shock;
these are also very similar to the benchmark case (see Figure 6).
39Figure A-6: Impulse Responses to Unanticipated Spending - Linear and Recession
Gov. Spending to Gov. Spending
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This gure shows impulse responses to an unanticipated government spending shock, both in the linear case
(solid lines) and in a recession (dashed lines). The system features defense news, total government spending,
consumer condence, and real GDP. The solid lines are the estimated impulse responses. The shaded gray
areas are 90 percent condence bands. The dashed lines are the impulse responses when condence is held
xed. The size of the shock in the non-linear system has been normalized to be the same as in the linear
system.
A.4 An Alternative Approach to Isolating the Role of Condence
In the main part of the paper, we x the underlying economic environment and isolate the
role of condence in the transmission of policy shocks by decomposing the observed average
eect of government spending on output into its direct eect and its indirect eect through
condence. An alternative interpretation of the question \Does Condence Matter in the
Transmission of Government Spending Shocks?" would be to restrict the coecients of the
underlying VAR in such a way as to force the response of condence to a spending shock
to be zero, and then compare the restricted impulse responses with the unrestricted ones.
There is a subtle dierence to the baseline approach: there we x the underlying economic
environment and study particular hypothetical shock combinations that hit this economy,
here we postulate a dierent (restricted) economic structure, i.e. condence is structurally
not allowed to respond to government spending and output shocks, and reestimate. Then we
compare how dierent the unrestricted and the restricted economy behave after a surprise
increase in government spending.
A necessary condition for condence to not react to a spending shock at any horizon is
a2;1 = 0, so that it not react on impact. This plus restricting the AR coecients on lagged
output and spending in the condence equation to zero will be sucient for imposing that
condence not react to a spending shock at any horizon. We implement these restrictions
40by estimating the benchmark three variable system using seemingly unrelated regressions,
with the additional restriction that condence not react to a spending shock on impact. The
impulse responses for the benchmark system with consumer condence are shown below, for
the linear case (Figure A-7) and recessions (Figure A-8).
Figure A-7: Impulse Responses to Spending Shock: Restriction on Condence - Linear
Gov. Spending to Gov. Spending
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The solid line in Figure A-7 shows the unrestricted impulse responses to a spending shock from the three
variable linear system with government spending, condence, and output. The dashed lines show responses
to a spending shock from a SUR system in which the coecients on lagged output and government spending
in the condence equation are restricted to be zero. The shaded gray areas are 90 percent condence bands.
Figure A-8: Impulse Responses to Spending Shock: Restriction on Condence - Recession
Gov. Spending to Gov. Spending
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The solid line in Figure A-8 shows the unrestricted impulse responses to a spending shock from the three
variable non-linear system in a recession. The dashed lines show responses to a spending shock from a SUR
system in which the coecients on lagged output and government spending in the condence equation are
restricted to be zero. The shaded gray areas are 90 percent condence bands. The size of the shock has been
normalized to be the same as in the linear system.
41Both gures, which show the linear and the recession response to a government spending
shock, respectively, are almost identical to what obtains in our benchmark approach (see
Figures 4 and 8).
A.5 Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
In the main text, we nd that government spending multipliers are much larger in recessions
compared to normal times. In addition, we nd that the hypothetical output response
without condence is much smaller. One potential concern is that the response of government
spending to its own shock is not the same in the hypothetical case. For example, see the
impulse responses in Figure 8 (in the upper left panel). There we observe that a spending
shock in a recession leads to a much less persistent response of spending when condence is
held xed.
In principle, the output response to a spending shock could be much smaller simply be-
cause the government spending response to its own shock is less persistent. This is consistent
with two dierent views of the world. On the one hand, the government spending response
could be smaller because the output response is weaker when condence is held xed. If
government spending responds positively to output uctuations with a delay (see Bachmann
and Bai, 2011), a weaker and less persistent response of government spending to its own
shock should be expected. On the other hand, it could also be the case that government
spending is responding directly to lagged condence. While this is possible, one might be
concerned that imprecisely estimated coecients on lagged condence could cause the gov-
ernment spending response to be less persistent and thus articially cause the smaller output
response.
To address this possibility, we re-estimate the system using seemingly unrelated regres-
sions (SUR), in which we impose a restriction that the coecients on lagged condence in
the government spending equation be zero. The identication of the spending shock and the
construction of the hypothetical impulse response where the indirect output eect is elimi-
nated are otherwise the same. Figure A-9 shows the linear actual and hypothetical responses;
Figure A-10 shows the linear vs. recession impulse responses, and Figure A-11 shows the
actual and hypothetical recession responses from the non-linear estimation. Although there
are some minor dierences with the benchmark estimates, the qualitative responses are the
same, as are the conclusions about the role of condence in the transmission of spending
shocks during a recession.
42Figure A-9: Impulse Responses to Spending Shock: SUR
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Figure A-9 shows impulse responses to a government spending shock from the benchmark system with
government spending, consumer condence, and real GDP, but estimated via seemingly unrelated regressions
(SUR) imposing that lagged condence does not appear in the government spending equation. The solid
lines are the estimated impulse responses. The shaded gray areas are 90 percent condence bands. The
dashed lines are the impulse responses when uncertainty is held xed.
Figure A-10: Impulse Responses to Spending Shock: SUR, Recession vs. Linear
Gov. Spending to Gov. Spending
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The dashed lines in Figure A-10 are impulse responses to a government spending shock in a recession
estimated from a non-linear system with government spending, consumer condence and real GDP via
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) imposing that lagged condence does not appear in the government
spending equation. The solid lines are the estimated impulse responses from the linear system, and the
shaded gray areas are the 90 percent condence bands from the linear system. The size of the shock in the
non-linear system has been normalized to be the same as in the linear system.
43Figure A-11: Impulse Responses to Spending Shock: SUR, Recession with and without
Condence
Gov. Spending to Gov. Spending






Confidence to Gov. Spending









Output to Gov. Spending
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The solid lines in Figure A-11 are estimated impulse responses to a government spending shock in a recession
estimated from the non-linear specication via seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) imposing that lagged
condence does not appear in the government spending equation. The shaded gray regions are 90 percent
condence bands. The dashed lines are the impulse responses when uncertainty is held xed. The size of
the shock has been normalized to be the same as in the linear system.
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